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Abstract. Philosophical naturalism is a suitable background for an account of aesthetic perception as an 
alternative to traditional aesthetic theory. Pragmatist notion of habits as meanings gives a basis for a 
conception of emotions and values in the framework of organism environment interaction. Any object of 
perception may be a carrier of meanings if some habits are involved. This holds for linguistic expressions as 
well as for tones of color, doors and windows, museums, galleries and other non-linguistic sign-vehicles. 




Aesthetics emerged as a theory of fine arts, specific skills for creating beautiful experiences. The basic 
concept is that of disinterested pure beauty. It suits for the purpose of detaching aesthetic perception from 
everyday life with its interests. Museums, galleries and concert halls were constructed as special places for 
pure aesthetic contemplation. The interest in fine arts served well for the development of the life style of 
the new social stratum, real fine gentlemen, as becomes clear from one proposal to the name of these 
special skills: polite arts for polite people. (Mortensen 1997; Shiner 2001.) 
John Dewey’s book Art as Experience deals with the same topic. It should be noted, however, that his 
philosophical framework is completely different. Traditional aesthetics was formed within German 
idealism, which Dewey rejected at some point of his career. This fact is often ignored when commenting or 
developing his later work. In his philosophy of art Dewey uses the same word “esthetic” (with the 
difference of one letter) but the concept is not the same. Dewey’s philosophical naturalism is the 
framework for developing an alternative conception of the experiences typical in (but not restricted to) fine 
arts. In one sense naturalism is a direct opposite of Immanuel Kant’s overall view. According to Kant, the 
pure forms of sensibility and the pure concepts and categories of human understanding constitute nature 
as an object of possible knowledge. Naturalism, on the other hand, regards the human mind and human 
culture as a product of nature. All cognitive capacities and cultural phenomena have developed on this 
planet without any help from over and above nature. This entails that mind is necessarily embodied, and 
this has consequences also in aesthetic theory (see Scarinzi 2015). 
There are, however, different forms of naturalism. The most common form can be called hard naturalism 
because of its appeal to (hard) natural science and reductionism (or mind/brain identity) in philosophy of 
mind (Määttänen 2006). John Dewey’s naturalism is different. Culture is a product of nature, and there is 
no a priori commitment to natural scientific methods. He sees science as problem solving. His answer to the 
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question of what methods should be used, what operations should be performed, is simple: “the nature of 
the problem” (Dewey 1984, 99). Dewey applied this topic sensitive approach also in his aesthetic theory. 
The problem is this. How can one give an account of the undeniably enjoyable and emotionally powerful 
experiences produced by music, paintings, poetry and the like without committing oneself to presumptions 
rejected in naturalism? These experiences may be called aesthetic experiences, but in Dewey’s framework 
it is conceptualized differently. This may sometimes lead to misinterpretations if one is not careful about 
the philosophical presumptions. 
Dewey’s soft naturalism shows also the way out of mind/brain identity with its commitment to the 
dichotomy of internal and external. He criticized the reflex arc concept because it tends to separate the 
body from its environment and suggested the notion of sensorimotor circuit instead (Dewey 1975b). This is 
a way to put emphasis on organism environment interaction. Combined with the pragmatist idea that the 
notion of experience as sense perception is too narrow, the role of action must be included, we get the 
view that interaction is realized through the loop of perception and action and that mind is a property of 
this loop rather than a property of the brain or even the body (Määttänen 2015b). 
The social and cultural reality is an essential element in the environment of human beings. Soft naturalism 
with the emphasis on interaction helps to find out the role of cultural factors in aesthetic perception. Not 
everything is revealed by investigating the brain. This is not to diminish the value of brain imaging or other 
methods of brain research. The point is that the same findings may have different interpretations in 
different conceptual frameworks. The purpose of the following analysis of the structure of experience and 
the character of values and emotions in the light of this structure is to provide a coherent conceptual 
framework for the analysis of aesthetic perception. 
 
2. The structure of experience in pragmatism 
 
The traditional view in philosophy is that experience is sense perception. Sense organs function as channels 
through which the internal mind observes the external world. Visual perception has dominated the 
discussion since it was discovered that the eye functions like a camera obscura. The retinal image was 
thought to continue to the brain and to change into a mental image. This view was originally developed by 
Johannes Kepler, Leonardo da Vinci and René Descartes (Noë 2004, 35-48). Classical empiricism adopted 
this approach. “The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet” (Locke 1959, I, 
48; emphasis in the original). David Hume considered the possibility that perceptions are produced by 
external objects and came to this conclusion. “But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind 
has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their 
connection with objects” (Hume 1975, 153). The object of knowledge in this kind of approach is the 
external world as the hidden cause of perceptions. The hidden causes as such cannot, of course, be 
perceived, and therefore the task of the experiencing subject is to find out what we can really know about 
these hidden causes. They form the mind-independent real world that we must come to know. 
This dichotomy of internal and external established by Descartes, Locke and their followers is still 
influential. Contemporary discussion continues this line of thought in attempts to relate mind and brain to 
each other. The mind/brain is internal quite literally. However, it has its critics that represent alternative 
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view. For example, it has been criticized for a mereological fallacy. Mental predicates are properly 
attributed to behaving persons, not to a part of them, namely the brain (Bennett & Hacker 2003, 68-107). 
This fallacy stems from Descartes. What Descartes said about the soul, is said about the brain.  
The dichotomy of external and internal can be questioned. Antonio Damasio (1995) enlarges the analysis 
from the brain to the whole body. Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) started the discussion about 
extended mind, which refers to the need to take things outside the brain into account. Further, there is a 
close connection between action and perception as Dewey already pointed out. “While the optical 
apparatus may be isolated in anatomical dissection, it never functions in isolation. It operates in connection 
with the hand in reaching for things and in exploring their surface, in guiding manipulation of things, in 
directing locomotion” (Dewey 1980, 100; emphasis in the original). Nowadays there is plenty of empirical 
evidence for it (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Noë 2004). Visual perception selects properties that facilitate 
organism environment interaction (Gibson 1979; Rizzolati & Sinigalia 2008). The environment becomes 
objectified in relation to motor capacities (Franks 2010, 88). There is not any gap or dualism between acting 
and reasoning in intelligent behavior (Caruana & Cuccio 2016). Various versions of enactivism (since Varela 
et al., 1992) also emphasize organism environment interaction. The role of interaction has found its way 
also to aesthetic theory (Xenakis, Arnellos & Darzentas 2011; Xenakis & Arnellos 2015). The main difference 
between these views and the present pragmatist approach is the explicit notion of meaning as habit of 
action. 
The pragmatist alternative to the classical approach is based on the ideas of Charles Peirce and John Dewey 
(see Määttänen 2015b). The pragmatist notion of experience is broader than sense perception; action must 
be included in it. The world is experienced as possibilities of action. To know is to know what to do in the 
present situation in order to achieve some goal. This view about the structure of experience opens the 
possibility for a very different conception of mind. Action and perception form a loop or a cycle that 
characterizes organism environment interaction. On this view mind is a property of this loop as a whole 
rather than a property of the brain or even the body. There are, however, different forms of pragmatism. 
Not everyone agrees with this view (see Hildebrand 2003, Määttänen 2010).  
The basic notion is that of habit of action. Habits are schematically structured forms or ways of action that 
are formed when similar behavior is repeated in similar circumstances. Action accommodates to objective 
conditions of action. The result of this is that the schematic structure of the formed habit fits with the 
objective conditions of action, the structure of the world. The habit is a belief about these conditions, and 
the fit between this belief and that what it is about is operational (Määttänen 2015b, 29-39). Note that this 
definition applies to both the physical and the social environment. Habits function also as meanings (ibid., 
41-50). What a thing means is simply what habits it involves.  Any object of perception may be a carrier of 
meaning, a sign-vehicle. All that is required is that some habits are involved. By virtue of habitual action, 
the object refers to anticipated consequences of that habitual action associated with the thing in question 
on the ground of past experiences of acting in similar circumstances. Note that this definition provides both 
tacit (non-linguistic) meanings and linguistic meanings. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s principle that meaning is use 
is a specific instance of Peirce’s definition (Määttänen 2005a). To be conscious is to be aware of various 
courses of action that are available. At the level of tacit meanings this is, for example, anticipation of the 
consequences of using tools, chairs, doors and so on. Abstract thought with language and scientific theories 
shows connections that are not immediate and thus enables one to anticipate more sophisticated 
operations and to see further and deeper. Thinking with meanings (and beliefs) is basically anticipation of 
action that is based on earlier experience.  
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The simple definition of habit as an outcome of repeated similar behavior in similar circumstances may hide 
the fact that experience is a complex thing. Long experience during the whole biological evolution has 
equipped us with many skills and capacities for coping with the environment. Sense organs can be seen as 
crystallized habits of perceiving environmental cues relevant for action control. Most of these capabilities 
function subconsciously (Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Franks 2010). The long history of cultural evolution has 
also accumulated social structures, cultural habits and practices. The relation between natural and cultural 
evolution is not simple because the social environment has existed long enough to have had an effect on 
our biological heritage. Other animals cannot become full-fledged members of human society. And this 
holds also for human infants if they grow outside human community. This is related to a phenomenon 
called the social brain (Donald 2001, Franks 2010). An infant’s brain gets wired for linguistic competence 
only in the context of a human linguistic community. This is the so-called Outside-Inside principle first 
suggested by L.S.Vygotsky. “The developmental rule is that symbolic thought first represents external 
action, and only later reconstructs it so that it will occur internally” (Donald 2001, 250). The outcome is 
what Donald calls a hybrid mind. The symbolic storage is in the environment and people equipped with the 
social brain can use these symbols, but nervous systems don’t use symbols comparable to numbers or 
words. Both parties, symbols and social brains, function together and form the hybrid mind. Human mind is 
a joint outcome of both parties of interaction. This view questions the classical dichotomy of external and 
internal and fits well with the present approach (although Donald does not refer in any way to the 
pragmatist tradition in philosophy). 
During ontogeny each individual, with her biological heritage, adopts some part of the culturally 
accumulated social experience. The outcome is a multilayered storage of experience that can be analyzed 
with the notion of habit of action. Anticipation of action is thinking with (tacit and linguistic) meanings that 
help to see the consequences of various courses of action. The object of knowledge is the relation between 
the present experiential situation and the future experiential situation, and this relation is mediated by 
controlled habitual behavior. This structure of experience is a suitable framework for analyzing the 
character of values and emotions. 
 
3. Emotions and values in pragmatism 
 
The traditional conception about the relationship between facts and values is the following. We can find 
out facts, how things are in the world, but values must be sharply distinguished from facts. Values are 
about how things ought to be or should not be. And it is a logical mistake, or so it is said, to try to infer 
values from facts. (Hume 1978, 468-469.) This conception is based on the view that experience is sense 
perception. The internal mind perceives with sense organs how things are in the external world, and one 
cannot literally perceive values “out there”. 
The problem with this conception is the erroneous conception of experience. The commitment to the 
dichotomy of external and internal also separates the internal mind from the external world of facts. 
However, philosophical naturalism does not allow of any immaterial mind. The body with its brain belongs 
to the material world. They are made of exactly the same stuff as the rest of the world. The stuff is only 
organized in a different way. Further, if we admit that action should be included in the notion of 
experience, then we cannot anymore content ourselves with what can be perceived at a given time. 
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According to the view described above, the world is experienced as possibilities of action, and the acting 
agent is part of the world. This conception of the structure of experience results to a quite different view 
about the relationship between facts and values. 
As said, the world is experienced as possibilities of action. In normal circumstances there are a great variety 
of these possibilities. It is impossible to carry out all the available possibilities at the same time. One simply 
has to choose. The choice is based on anticipation of action. Anticipation of action brings to mind what kind 
of consequences habitual action has had before. These consequences have some value for the acting agent. 
In other words, for an acting agent capable of habitual action, the perceived features of the environment 
refer (consciously or subconsciously) to anticipated consequences of action. In order to act one must 
choose, and the choice is based on the anticipated value of the future consequences. For an acting agent, 
facts and values are necessarily intertwined in experience. David Hume missed this point because of his 
conception of experience as sense perception. (Määttänen 2015b, 67-75; 2015c.) 
Antonio Damasio (1995) has put forward the so-called somatic marker hypothesis according to which 
emotions are signs of values. This view fits well with the present version of pragmatism. Emotions are 
based on the values of the anticipated future experience to the acting agent. Anticipation proceeds with 
habits that function as meanings referring to the future experiences. Most of the cognition with tacit 
meanings is subconscious and cannot be accessed by introspection. This is due to the complex and 
multilayered character of experience, on the ground of which the anticipation of action proceeds. Biological 
evolution, cultural heritage, individual growth and education have all an influence on emotional reactions 
to the environment. The idea is that the outcome of the subconscious cognition becomes conscious as 
emotions that warn us about potential dangers and help to concentrate on how to achieve promising goals. 
As Damasio points out, emotions and rational cognition function together. Damasio’s conception of 
emotions and values can be applied also to aesthetic perception. 
 
4. Aesthetic perception 
 
Aesthetics emerged as a theory of fine arts, skills of producing beautiful experiences. There are reasons 
why just these experiences were chosen as beautiful. Aesthetics is supposed to describe and explain why, 
what is peculiar about these experiences. Why are these experiences enjoyable, emotionally powerful? The 
idea of disinterested pure beauty was introduced to explain this. However, traditional aesthetics 
entertained philosophical background assumptions that can be questioned. The task of an alternative 
approach is to give a different explication of the phenomenon. 
John Dewey’s account of aesthetic experience is based on philosophical naturalism (Dewey 1980). As said, 
the same word gets a quite different content. Traditional aesthetics separated and isolated aesthetic 
experience from other experiences. Dewey searches for continuity with life in general. There is no need to 
speak about specific aesthetic emotions that would have little or nothing to do with emotions in general. 
The same emotional mechanisms are responsible for the enjoyable character of music, paintings and so on, 
but perhaps in a different way. Another difference is that Dewey does not appeal to beauty or sublime but 
gives a formal definition of an aesthetic experience. It is formal in the sense that it is independent of the 
content of the experience. The main requirement is that it is rather a goal than a means for other 
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experiences. In order to get into a concert one usually gets a ticket buying experience before the concert, 
but it is usually not the reason why people go to concerts. The music experience is different. Further 
features that Dewey gives are the consummatory character of the aesthetic experience; something has 
come to an end. It has unity, is enjoyable, emotionally powerful and most importantly valuable for its own 
sake. “An object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic 
perception, when the factors that determine anything which can be called an experience are lifted high 
above the threshold of perception and are made manifest for their own sake” (Dewey 1980, 57). There is 
continuity, but there is also a difference, relative disinterestedness. Aesthetic experience remains at the 
level of perception. Aesthetic perception is not directly connected to everyday practices. As pointed out 
above, it is a goal rather than a means. This characterization is, however, relative in the sense that aesthetic 
experiences may be means for one’s education and so on. That these experiences are not isolated from life 
in general is based on the fact that perception is always interpreted with meanings. And meanings are, in 
pragmatism, ultimately habits and practices. Also symbolic meanings expressed in language have their 
connection with tacit meanings. Interpretation with meanings is based on anticipation of action, but in 
aesthetic perception these anticipations are not actualized. The consummatory character of aesthetic 
perception is only a promise of actual consummation that is enjoyable in itself. This is relative 
disinterestedness. The connection with life is manifested also in the interplay of continuity and difference. 
Quite a variety of experiences may have aesthetic quality, a consummatory aspect. 
Dewey’s approach suits well for discussing everyday experience from the viewpoint of aesthetic perception 
(Määttänen 2005b). For example, a visit to Finnish sauna most certainly has a consummatory aspect that 
makes it enjoyable in itself. It makes also sense to say that the goal of product design is to find a good 
combination of functionality and aesthetic aspects, to create a user experience with aesthetic quality. 
Everyday aesthetics is a common theme in the field. However, Dewey’s efforts to develop an alternative to 
traditional aesthetics are sometimes ignored. Yuriko Saito, for example, has written a book on the topic and 
comments also Dewey’s views. According to Saito “most of us have had an aesthetic experience through 
adopting a disinterested attitude” (Saito 2007, 43). This is typical for traditional aesthetics. Dewey took 
distance to these views: “’Disinterestedness’ cannot signify uninterestedness” (Dewey 1980, 257). Dewey 
does not separate aesthetic experience from the interests of everyday life. He rather seeks connections and 
continuity. The discussion about an experience (with the emphasis) as a special experience that is 
demarcated from the general flow of life (ibid., 35-57). Saito, on the other hand, is quite clear about the 
attitude to traditional aesthetics. The mission of everyday aesthetics is to follow the guide suggested by the 
traditional aesthetic regarding aesthetic attitude and disinterestedness” (Saito 2007, 244). There is a need 
to distinguish between everyday aesthetics as an extension of traditional theory with its philosophical 
presumptions and Dewey’s attempt to redefine the whole framework of discussion. 
The present pragmatist framework puts aesthetic perception in the context of organism environment 
interaction.  The view of mind as a property of interaction entails that there is no need to appeal to literally 
internal representations in the brain. Meanings (thoughts, ideas) are relations (processes) between 
organisms, sign-vehicles and their referents. The brain functions with anticipatory mechanisms that enable 
the organism to cope with the natural and social environment. Experience is interaction, and its character 
depends on the parties of interaction, the human body and its environment. The mind is a hybrid not only 
in Merlin Donald’s sense (analogue brain functioning together with the symbolic environment, linguistic 
community) but also in the sense that we are a joint product of natural evolution and cultural history. 
Nature and culture are not separate spheres beside each other. The natural and cultural elements of the 
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human mind form a complex whole in the manner of the multilayered system of meanings and that of 
experience. This holds also for aesthetic perception. 
 
5. Emotions in aesthetic perception 
 
Emotional quality is probably one of the reasons why certain experiences were chosen to be beautiful. 
However, emotions in aesthetic perception, especially when listening to music, have been problematic in 
traditional aesthetic theory. Emotions in music don’t have obvious and consciously identified objects that 
they would be of and about. Formalism is one way to deal with this aspect. Susanne Langer (1942, 1953) 
maintains that sounds in music are symbols that do not denote to anything, and the connection with 
emotions is based on form: musical forms resemble the forms of emotions, and this explains music’s ability 
to evoke emotions. Peter Kivy’s (1989) problem is the emotional quality of music itself. How can music be 
sad while it is a work of art external to the human mind, an inanimate thing? Kivy’s solution is based on St. 
Bernard. The dog looks sad but need not be sad, and so it is with music. Kivy’s problem is related to the 
classical dichotomy of internal and external discussed above. Physical world is external and mind, thoughts, 
experiences, emotions are internal. Correspondingly a work of art, even a piece of music, is a physical 
external entity that cannot have emotions. This view can be questioned. The alternative view considers 
experience as organism environment interaction. 
John Dewey made the distinction between an object of art and a work of art. A work of art is for Dewey 
experience, as should be clear already from the title of his book Art as Experience. An object of art is a 
physical thing that can hang on a wall, but “[t]he real work of art is the building up of an integral experience 
out of the interaction of organic and environmental conditions and energies” (Dewey 1980, 64). In other 
worlds, a work of art for Dewey is the object of art as experienced. Experiences differ from physical bodies 
in that their mode of existence is different. A physical body is an individual object that may have a specific 
location on a wall of a white cube. Experiences, on the other hand, exist as modes of organism environment 
interaction. Experiences cannot hang anywhere. 
Dewey’s distinction is deeper than it seems. Consider colors. It looks like the colors of a painting are its 
intrinsic physical properties, but strictly speaking the colors are the joint outcome of light, pigments on the 
canvas and the biological structure of an organism with eyes. In this sense colors are properties of organism 
environment interaction. It is misleading to speak about colors of a painting as physical properties of a 
physical object because nobody can look at a painting without having a visual experience of it. Dewey’s 
distinction holds also for music. As physical entities sounds are just vibrations in a medium, like air. On the 
other hand, sounds are the effect of these vibrations on some organism with ears. Which one is music? In 
Dewey’s view, a work of art is an object of art as experienced. If we accept this definition, then Kivy’s 
problem vanishes. Music consists properly speaking of (actually or potentially) perceived, experienced 
sounds? Experience is always emotionally saturated, and this holds also for music. Vibrations in air form the 
object, but the work of art is these physical processes as experience. Dewey’s distinction holds for every 
thinkable form of art because it is based on a general philosophical position concerning the character of 
experience with which Dewey rejects the basic background assumptions of traditional aesthetics. 
Experience is the outcome of organism environment interaction, not something literally in the head. 
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There is still the question of the role and character of emotions in aesthetic perception. Traditional 
aesthetics aims at separating aesthetic experience from everyday life with the notion of a special aesthetic 
emotion typical only for art (for example Bell 1958). Dewey’s perspective searches connections with life 
and this holds also for emotions. Antonio Damasio’s theories about emotions in general are helpful here. 
One of his basic principles is the somatic marker hypothesis according to which emotions are signs of values 
(Damasio 1995). If this is correct, then the question is the following. To what sort of values do emotions 
refer in aesthetic perception? Not surprisingly, Dewey’s theory of emotion has a role here too (Dewey 
1975a). 
The general idea is that past experience involves accumulation of acquired habits that function as 
meanings, which refer to experienced consequences of habitual action. These consequences have been of 
some value. The present suggestion is that the outcome of subconscious cognition with habits as meanings 
becomes conscious as emotions that the past experiences have evoked. Let’s start from the beginning, 
from biological evolution. Consider Dewey’s summary of a phenomenon that he calls Gefühlston.  
“Certain movements, formerly useful in themselves, become reduced to tendencies to action, to attitudes. 
As such they serve, when instinctively aroused into action, as means for realizing ends. But so far as there is 
difficulty in adjusting the organic activity represented by the attitude with that which stands for the idea or 
end, there is temporary struggle and partial inhibition. This is reported as Affect, or emotional seizure. Let 
the co-ordination be effected in one act, instead of in a successive series of mutually exclusive stimuli, and 
we have interest. Let such co-ordinations become thoroughly habitual and hereditary, and we have 
Gefühlston.” (Dewey 1975a, 188.) 
Any object of perception may be a carrier of meaning, and this holds also for colors and sounds. They refer 
subconsciously to the whole past experience as emotional seizure. The color red has a different Gefühlston 
than green or blue, and this is probably due to the past experiences related to these colors. Red has been 
related to fire, blood and maybe sexuality, that is, to stronger experiences than seeing the blue sky, for 
example. And sense organs as crystallized habits don’t function in isolation. The ability to perceive certain 
properties has developed just because of the significance of these properties, and the emotional attitudes 
have developed during the same process. The Gefühlston of different aspects of perceived environment 
may well be an element in what makes up aesthetic quality, which can characterize perception not only in 
the context of  fine arts. 
Emotionally charged aesthetic quality has its sources in biological evolution. These emotions refer to 
accumulated past experiences. Habits as meanings explain this reference that cannot be accessed by 
introspection because of the role of subconscious mechanisms, habits crystallized as bodily organs, and 
tacit meanings, which control the relationship to the environment without the need of conscious attention. 
However, human beings are also cultural creatures. Soft naturalism combined with the view emphasizing 
the genuinely social character of human mind gives the possibility to examine the social and historical 
aspects related to aesthetic perception. 
 




According to the semiotic theory of Charles Peirce the sign-relation is a three-place relation. A sign-vehicle 
refers to its object. The sign-vehicle must be interpreted to refer to the object, and therefore a third 
element, the interpretant, is required. An interpretant may be another sign-vehicle. If this is the case, then 
there has to be an interpretant for this sign-vehicle so that the requirement of a three-place relation is 
fulfilled. This interpretant may also be a sign-vehicle, which must be interpreted, and so the process of 
interpretation may continue to indefinite future. However, there is a special kind of interpretant, final 
logical interpretant to which the process of interpretation ends.  This final logical interpretant is habit of 
action, which is actualized as acts in the world. This entails that habitual action is a way to interpret and 
understand the world. (Määttänen 2015b.) 
For a pragmatist, the social reality exists as shared habits and practices, which are meaningful of their own 
right. Social practices may have definite locations. The practices are different, for example, in market place, 
church, cemetery, governmental palace, pub and so on. These different practices embody different 
meanings. The locations of these practices function as sign-vehicles, carriers of these meanings. 
(Määttänen 2007.) A special location for special practices is also the so-called white cube. The traditional 
aesthetic theory is not only written in books and journals. Museums, galleries, concert halls and opera 
houses are endowed with tacit and symbolic meanings that were created during the development of the 
practices and theories of fine arts. During this period paintings were transferred from homes to museums 
and galleries, music from courts to concert halls and opera houses. (Shiner 2001.) These places are special 
locations for the new social class with money and free time to carry on the practices of the contemplation 
of what was called disinterested pure beauty. These practices of fine art are meaningful in themselves, and 
the traditional aesthetic theory was created as a theory about these practices and experiences. The 
practices with meaningful locations and the theory support each other; they form a consistent system of 
tacit and symbolic meanings. These practices and locations in the urban space are still with us. So far as one 
participates in these practices one adopts (consciously or subconsciously) the meanings and goals (values) 
involved. 
The point is that the place where perception takes place has an effect on how the perceptions are 
interpreted. The spatial semiotics is one element in the system of meanings with which we orient ourselves 
to the environment, how we experience it. This is one way to solve the problem of Brillo Box. What is the 
difference between a Brillo Box in a supermarket and a Brillo Box in Andy Warhol’s show? Physically they 
are similar. Here we need again the distinction between an object of art and a work of art. The object may 
be the same, but the experience is different. When one enters gallery space the location functions as a 
sign-vehicle and brings to mind the adopted system of tacit and symbolic meanings that are related to the 
fine arts tradition (depending, of course, on ones education and other background). The Brillo Box in a 
gallery is interpreted with the meanings associated with the location and, of course, the artist’s fame and 
the artworld as a whole. With the meanings come the corresponding values and emotions. The value of the 
box in gallery is loaded with the values of fine arts experiences. This is why there is a big difference 
between the values (and the prices) of these boxes. Meanings and values associated with other locations 
have also an effect on how art is experienced. A plan to present heavy metal music in a church may face 
resistance because two quite different systems of meanings and values are involved, and value conflicts 
arouse emotions, as one would expect. 
 




Perception is always interpreted with meanings acquired on the ground of past experience. The outcome of 
experience is a multilayered system of meanings based on different aspects of past experience. The sources 
of meanings are biological evolution, cultural history and individual experience during which one adopts 
some aspects of one’s social and cultural environment with one’s hereditary resources. Different people 
have different storage of meanings that is evolving all the time as life goes on. Habitual action is goal-
directed activity based on anticipated experiential values, which arouse corresponding emotions. Most of 
this takes place subconsciously. 
The basic emotional dimension of aesthetic perception is the emotional tone stemming from biological 
evolution, Dewey’s Gefühlston. This tone of feeling is probably one of the reasons why certain skills were 
chosen as fine arts that produce beautiful experiences. There are certainly historical reasons as well. And 
the experienced Gefühlston is not independent of the influence of the later cultural elements in the 
accumulated experience. Because of its subconscious and possibly incoherent character it cannot be 
analyzed introspectively any further. 
The emergence of the practice and theory of fine arts has left its trace in contemporary social environment 
and urban space. The social practices related to fine arts have traditionally been valued high in comparison 
with popular culture and everyday life. This appreciation shows itself as positive emotions associated with 
works of art. During socialization and education people adopt these values and emotional attitudes to 
certain extent that depends on how closely they are related to the practices. The conscious theoretical 
attitude is supported by the tacit meanings and values of spatial semiotics, which are often strengthened 
by appropriate (wow) architecture. This cultural dimension of aesthetic perception functions intertwined 
with the biological dimension. 
The traditional aesthetic theory is still with us, but not only as a theory and presumptions of art criticism 
but also as tacit meanings tied to certain locations in the urban space. The philosophical framework of 
traditional aesthetics is only one strand in this whole. The rejection of this framework at the level of theory 
does not by itself change the already formed practices with the related meanings and values. It can, 
however, change our conception of these practices and their relation to other forms of life. 
Dewey’s definition is not based on specific concepts like beauty or sublime. According to him aesthetic 
experience has a unity, is consummatory and enjoyable, an end rather than a direct means to other 
experiences. It broadens the scope of the concept. Aesthetic appreciation is not a privilege of the 
traditional fine arts. There are other ways of producing aesthetic experience in Dewey’s sense (witness his 
suggestion of “jazzed music” as art). Dewey’s definition blur’s the border between popular culture and fine 
arts.  It is aesthetics of gender blender.  And there is no need to separate aesthetic perception from other 
social practices. This sort of pluralism makes room for different genres and traditions with their own 
standards of taste. Especially there is no need to justify jazz or rap music as forms of art by appealing to the 
alleged fact that one can use in them the same criteria as traditional aesthetics in classical music, for 
example. The notion of aesthetic perception is a complex whole with many dimensions depending on the 
genre and its own traditions, social context and concrete location. 
In soft naturalism culture is simply a product of nature, a system that one animal species has developed 
here on planet Earth. This view, combined with the idea of mind as a property of organism environment 
interaction, opens the possibility to take cultural and historical elements explicitly into account in analyzing 
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the character of aesthetic perception. The difference between symbolic meanings (language) and tacit 
meanings as social practices with their sign-vehicles in urban space sheds light to the nuanced character of 
aesthetic perception. 
There are three layers of experience as sources of habitual coping with the environment: natural evolution, 
cultural history and individual experience. Acquired habits function as meanings, tacit and symbolic, 
consciously or subconsciously. Basic emotional attitudes stem from biological inheritance. Social and 
cultural habits adopted during individual growth intertwine to this and the result is a whole where all 
aspects may have an effect to others. Aesthetic perception is situated. It is interpreted with a multilayered 
and complex system of meanings associated with different aspects of the situation: the object in focus, its 
qualities, and its location in physical and cultural environment. It is aesthetic by virtue of its consummatory 
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